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1,H 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF r.rHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Pl,aintiff -Respondent, 
vs. 
KENNETH TRUSTY, 
Def endant-Appell,ant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12469 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Kenneth Trusty, appeals from the 
finding of guilty of the crime of murder in the second de-
gree and from the sentence imposed upon him in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
on the 26th day of January, 1971. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On December 14 through 19, 1970, the appellant, 
Kenneth Trusty, was tried by a jury and was found guilty 
of the offense of murder in the second degree. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have this Court affirm the judg. 
ment of the lower court which found appellant guilty o! 
the offense of murder in the second degree. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees generally with the facts as st.aw 
by appellant and offers the following additional clarifica. 
tions: 
Appellant admitted that he killed the deceased, Craig 
Crandall (T. 276, 330). Other testimony established that 
appellant had made strong admissions against his inter· 
est (T. 166, 187, 210, 224). There was ample evidence 
presented during the trial to warrant the jury's finding. 
The appellant's credibility was in question and his 
testimony was impeached. He testified that he did not 
mean to kill the deceased (T. 275, 292). When asked il 
he wanted the man dead, the appellant replied: 
A. No, sir. If I could bring his life back right 
now, I'll swear on the Bible, I'd bring it back, ana 
they can take mine right now. I didn't mean for 
it to happen. I want the jury to believe this. 
Q. Did you want him dead? 
'• 0 
Yet the appellant told Mickey Norwood that "he 
could go ahead and shoot the deceased if he wanted" (T. 
210). Mr. Norwood further testified to what the appel-
lant had said: 
A. Yes. He told me he was - he's not sorry 
that he did it. He said he was glad that he done 
it. He said he would have done it again. 
Q. I'm sorry, I didn't hear you. 
A. He said he would do it again if he had to 
do it all over again (T. 211). 
Later during the trial, the appellant was found to have 
said the following: 
Well, when he said it, he says, "I'm glad I killed 
him." He says, "I'd do it again." He says, "I'm 
not sorry, mom." He says, "I'm happy. I'm glad," 
is what he was saying (T. 224-225). See also (T. 
380). 
The appellant himself, while on the stand, admitted that 
he said he was glad he had killed the deceased and if he 
had it [,o do over again he would kill him again (T. 391). 
After being shot in the head, the deceased was alive 
and gasping. The appellant allowed his victim to die, 
and made no effort to call an ambulance or get help (T. 
275, 361-367). 
Mrs. Jean Ortega testified that :ippellant admitted 
that the reason he killed the deceased was because the 
deceased had an affair with his wife (T. 173, 210). The 
killing was not the result of an accident (T. 224). 
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Appellant's wife admitted to the affair with the de. 
ceased and to the pills because the defendant beat her 
I 
choked her, and then stabbed her, causing her to lose a I 
a great deal of blood (T. 271, 324-325). He also point€Q 
his gun at their adopted son Donald and threatened fo 
kill both of them if she did not talk (T. 311). It appears 
that the appellant's wife may have been FORCED fo 
admit to things which she did not do. 
The appellant kept changing his story, and he gave 
three different versions to Mr. Norwood. The first version 
was that he caught them "cold turkey", and the last ver· 
sion progressed to a well-planned scheme between the 
deceased and appellant's wife where they had drugged 
the appellant (T. 213, 224). The appellant would lead 
the jury to believe that he was being drugged, that he 
was sleeping much more than usual, and that he was 
drowsy all the time (T. 256-257). But the inferences 
that could be drawn from appellant's testimony and life 
style show that he went to bed at 11: 00 o'clock at night 
and got up at 5:00 o'clock in the morning (T. 474). The 
pharmacist's testimony, William Scott Hoge, indicated 
that the pills in appellant's home would not cause the 
effects complained of (T. 455-458). 
The trial put appellant's veracity in jeopardy. His 
testimony had been impeached, and his credibility was 
waning. At this point, the state asked appellant if what 
he said was true, and if his wife's testimony would sup· 
port him. Appellant's reply was in the affirmative to both 
questions (T. 349). 
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The drawn-out ardent trial lasted 6 days and covered 
over 640 pages of record. A jury trial of that length un-
derstandably involves a considerable expense to the state 
and monopolizes the desperately needed, over-crowded 
courtroom facilities. The court's concern was well taken 
as two conflicting points of law met head-on (T. 356). 
The judge commented: "If I can save this trial I will" (T. 
358). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
BECAUSE THE COMBINED COMMENTS 
OF THE PROSECUTOR AND THE COURT 
D I D N 0 T CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR WHICH WOULD WARRANT A RE-
VERSAL. 
Recent court opinion has been rapidly fashioning the 
law with regard to a wife's testimony against her hus-
band. While the cases seem to be in confusion, a closer 
look will establish that the courts are not reaching deci-
sions by a hard and fast rule which quickly determines 
whether or not the case will stand or fall regardless of 
the circumstance. Rather, the courts are making their 
decision by examining the facts of the case, incorporating 
the surrounding circumstance, and then applying the 
careful considerations of equitable adjudication and pol-
icy. The confusion in recent opinions will disappear as 
6 
the policies by which courts have decided this issue be. 
come apparent. 
At first glance, there seems to be a contradiction ! 
among court opinions. It appears that some decisions 
allow comments upon the failure of a witness to testify 
while others do not. Those cases allowing comment upon 
the failure to testify are supported with a United States 
Supreme Court decision. In Graves v. United States, 150 
U. S. 118 (1893), the court held that failure to produce 
a witness would create the presumption that the testi· 
mony would be unfavorable. See also Bland v. Richmond, 
55 S. E. 2d 289 (Va. 1949) at 291; Wynn v. United States, 
397 F. 2d 621 (1967) at 625-26. Other cases seem to be 
strongly in favor of allowing comment on the wife's fail· 
ure to testify. See Marrone v. State, 359 P. 2d 969 
(Alaska 1961) at 982-83; Bisno v. United States, 299 F. 
2d 711 (9th Cir. 1962); People v. Coleman, 459 P. 2d 248 
(Calif. 1969) . 1 
However, there are cases which have held just the I 
opposite by declaring that presumptuous comments upon I 
a wife's failure to testify constitutes reversible error. See I 
Courtney v. United States, 390 F. 2d 521 (9th Cir. 1968); !' 
State v. Levy, 160 N. W. 2d 460 (Iowa 1968); State v. 
Brown, 14 Utah 2d 324, 383 P. 2d 930 (1963). A dis· 1 
tinguishing factor of the last three cases is that the com· 
ments and circumstances were so repetitious or severe as 
to leave a very strong and direct inference of the defen· 
dant's guilt. 
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The decisions show that reversible error is not com-
mitted simply because the magical words "wife's testi-
mony" are mentioned, but because a strong inference 
arises affecting defendant's constitutional rights. See 
Eads v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. 628, 170 S. W. 145 (1914); 
State v. Bell, 272 N. W. 334 (N. Dak. 1937). 
H-."v ::ng determined that a comment was improper, 
the court must then determine whether or not the effect 
ci said corn:ment was so prejudicial as to constitute 
g.21.md;', Ln le·1e~-sal. See 32 A. L. R. 3d 915, §§ 5, 6 
(197C). In Clayton v. State, 465 S. W. 2d 769 (Tex. Crim. 
1971), the reviewing court found the comment clearly im-
proper, but not constituting grounds for reversal. 
The merits for reversal must be established in a case 
by case determination in light of the facts and circum-
stances. The matter is largely discretionary and can best 
be determined by the trial court's advantaged position 
which views the events in light of the surrounding cir-
cumstance. 
This court elaborated upon the difficulty involved 
in determining whether or not a comment on privileged 
testimony constitutes prejudicial error. In State v. Brown, 
suprn., this court stated: 
The cases are in hopeless confusion on whether, 
under somewhat similar circumstances and stat-
utes, such comment on the failure to testify is 
prejudicial error. Id. at 932. 
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The comment in Brown was so prejudicial that its only 
means of correction was through reversal and retrial. But 
the comments in the present case are of a different nature 
' made under a different set of circumstances, and do not 
constitute prejudicial error. 
In Brown, the defendant's defense was an alibi in 
which he was home with his wife when the rape occurred. 
The establishment of the truth of the alibi would prevent 
defendant's conviction and demand his acquittal. The 
district attorney's comments that Brown's wife "did not 
testify" and that she "is the one person who could have 
said defendant was at home," coupled with the circum-
stances of the case, suggested such a strong inference to 
the jury as to constitute prejudicial error. Id. at 931. If 1 
Brown's wife could have substantiated the alibi, it would 
have meant his acquittal. Everything rested upon the 
testimony of Brown's wife. Brown could only preserve 
his freedom by her testimony. Preventing Brown's wife 
from testifying because she would destroy his alibi was 
a presumption so apparent that any comment upon it I 
would draw inferences tantamount to a waiver of defen· 
dant's constitutional rights. 
In the instant case, however, there is no such omniv· 
orous presumption. There was already ample evidence 
to support the jury's finding. The weak testimony of 
appellant was a meager defense against the strong evi· 
dence prec,e~tcd by the state. Appellant's testimony had 
been impeached, his credibility was in question, and he 
had already admitted to the killing. His admissions against . 
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interest were to be regarded as the strongest kind of evi-
dence. See Hiniger v. Judy, 194 Kan. 155, 398 P. 2d 305 
(1965). When the prosecuting attorney believed that 
he wasn't getting correct answers from appellant, he 
asked appellant if he was telling the truth. He then asked 
appellant if his wife would testify to the same thing. The 
appellant replied that he hoped she would testify to the 
truth, that she doped him and was having an affair (T. 
349). The prosecutor did not tell the jury that the reason 
appellant's wife was not testifying was because it would 
be against appellant's interest. He merely asked appellant 
if his wife's testimony would conform with his own. The 
question was directed in part to those portions of the 
wife's testimony which were not privileged communication 
(T. 352). The question was strictly an attack upon ap-
pellant's credibility (T. 351). 
Part of the wife's testimony would have been admis-
sible as long as it did not involve privileged communica-
tion. See People v. O'Dell, 36 A. D. 2d 774, 318 N. Y. S. 
2d 908 (1971); State v. Cox, 106 Utah 253, 147 P. 2d 858 
(1944) at 859. Because all of the husband-wife communi-
cations were not privileged, parts of her complete testi-
mony could have been allowed. See United States v. 
Lewis, 433 F. 2d 1146 (1970); McCormick on Evidence, 
H 79, 80 (2d Ed. 1972) at 163-167; Jones on Evidence, 
~ 19 (5th Ed. 1958) at 1537. Since communication in the 
presence of children is not privileged, the testimony con-
cerning the communications in the presence of appellant's 
thirteen year old son, Donald Trusty, might have been 
10 
allowed. See Wolfe v. United States, 291 U. S. 7 (1934), 
The critical testimony in the presence of the deceased 
might also have come in because it was not confidential 
in that it was given in the presence of a third party. State 1 
v. Moxley, 6 Wash. App. 153, 491 P. 2d 1326 (1971), held 
that a threat to ldll defendant's wife was not protected 
by marital privilege in the prosecution for arson of wife's 
house, even though motive was not an ingredient of the 
crime. See also State v. Americk, 256 P. 2d 278 (Wash. 
1953). One of the exceptions to the marital privilege in 
the Utah Code Ann. § 77-44-4 (1953), states: " ... in 
cases of criminal violence upon one by the other." In the 
instant case, appellant's stabbing of his wife is a crime of 
violence. 
A case very similar to Brown, supra, also found re· 
versible error. In its opinion, People v. Wilkes, 284 P. 2d 
481 (Calif. 1955), stated that such errors are usually not 
prejudicial, and are not cause for reversal. However, an 
analysis of the "facts" and "circumstances" demonstrated 
grounds for reversal because of the strong inference which 
was created. The court stated: "The prosecution's com· 
ment erroneously and deliberately struck at the heart of 1 
defendant's only defense, their sharply controverted ali· 
bi." Id. at 486. 
Other cases which do not bear the similar circum· i 
stances of Brown, supra, have found the error not suffi : 
ciently prejudicial to justify a reversal. In Stallings v. ! 
State, 476 S. W. 2d 679 (Tex. Crim. 1972), the state was I 
entitled to point out that appellant could call his wife as ! 
. : 
I 
' 
' 
I ' ': 
' 
s I 
s ! 
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a witness if he desired, but that the state could not. The 
court found no reversible error from the following con-
versation: 
"Q. Now, Mr. Stallings, you're aware of the 
fact, aren't you, that I can't call your wife to tes-
tify? 
"A. I'm aware of that fact, yes, sir. I've had 
it explained to me by Mr. Hancock. 
"Q. You're also aware of the fact that you 
can bring her to testify? 
"A. That's right." Id. at 682. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona in Guldin v. State, 161 P. 
2d 121 (Ariz. 1945), held that a comment by the county 
attorney on the wife's failure to testify was not reversible 
error. The county attorney's comment was as follows: 
" 'If the defense wanted to bring out a motive 
of the defendant's wife in bringing this charge 
against the defendant, why did the defense not 
produce her here to prove the motive of the 
charge?'" Id. at 124. 
In People v. Klor, 197 P. 2d 705 (Calif. 1948), the court 
held that the calling out of the wife's name during the 
course of the trial with no evident intention of making 
her a witness, coupled with argument to the jury as to 
her failure to testify, was improper and unwarranted, but 
it did not require a reversal. See also People v. Green, 302 
P. 2d 307 (Calif. 1956). In People v. Harmon, 200 P. 2d 
32 (Cal. 1948) , the court did not find reversible error in 
the district attorney's comment on the failure of defen-
12 
dant's wife to testify even though she knew whether or 
not the events alleged had really occurred. The district , 
attorney also made the following statement to the jury: I 
"The law does not permit me to produce her, ! 
The law permits the defendant to produce her. If 
he cannot produce her, he has the right to offer . 
some explanation why she was not here to the' 
jury, and the fact that they did not produce her i 
permits you to draw an inference from that fact. f 
* * * It is, an inference against the defen-
dant." Id. at 36. 
While there was no reversible error, the inference 
of defendant's wife's testimony being adverse to his posi-
tion was stronger in the above cited cases than the infer-
ence found in the present case. The facts of the inst.ant 
case clearly show that the improper comment would not 
justify a reversal. 
When there has been an improper comment about a . 
wife's privilege, the misconduct will not be prejudicial i 
where the court properly admonishes the jury to disregard i 
the prosecutor's comment. See People v. Martina, 294: 
P. 2d 1015 (Cal. App. 1956); People v. Bigelow, 332 P. ' 
2d 162 (Cal. App. 1959); People v. Klor, supra, at 708. 
Although the court held prejudicial error, the Supreme 
Court of Georgia in Askins v. State, 81 S. E. 2d 471 
(1954), stated: 
"All injurious effects and all implications 
might have been erased from the minds of the jury 
by proper action by the trial judge." Id. at 473. 
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State v. Inman, 492 P. 2d 804 (Or. App. 1972), states: 
If, as claimed, an adverse inference unavoidably 
arises in the minds of the jury from the failure 
to produce available and relevant testimony not-
withstanding an instruction by the court that they 
should draw no inference, then it appears more in 
consonance with the modern and enlightened prin-
ciples of justice that the one who excludes the 
truth should bear the burden rather than the one 
who desires, but can not produce it. Id. at 805. 
The prosecutor's improper comment was effectively 
cured by the court's admonition to the jury. To remove 
the possibility of an erroneous inference to the jury the 
judge instructed them to "totally disregard" any ques-
tions regarding whether or not Mrs. Trusty would testify 
. . . "It is completely irrelevant in this case and you're 
not to consider that point at all" (T. 359). 
For purposes of policy considerations, the Rules of 
Evidence as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court effective 
July 1, 1971, would allow the wife's testimony under Rule 
23 and Rule 28. Rule 23 (2) (b) of the Uniform Rules 
of Evidence gives the following exception to the marital 
privilege: " ... as to the communication, in an action in 
which the accused offers evidence of a communication 
between himself and his spouse." The Utah Rule con-
tains the same words. The comment with the Uniform 
Rules explains this phrase: 
"Exception (b) is necessary to prevent the 
accused from offering evidence of communications 
14 
favorable to himself and then claiming the privi. 
lege as to those which are unfavorable." 
Policy considerations demand that appellant's appeal 
should fail. 
In solving the difficult question as to whether or not 
there was reversible prejudicial error, wide discretion is 
vested in the trial court. See Burton v. Zions Co-op., 122 
Utah 360, 249 P. 2d 514 (1952); Hanks v. Christensen, 
11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P. 2d 564 (1960); Mayer v. Sampson, 
402 P. 2d 185 (Colo. 1965). 
Unless clearly abused, the wide discretion of the trial 
court should not be interfered with by a reviewing court. 
See Bowden v. Denver, 3 Utah 2d 444, 286 P. 2d 240 
(1955). Before a judge should grant a new trial, the error 
should be so substantial and prejudicial that there is rea· 
sonable likelihood that the result would have been differ· 
ent in the absence of the error. See Id.; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-42-1 (1953). 
In Mayne v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 195, 468 P. 2d 369 
(1970), this Court held that where a trial court has a 
statutory alternative based on discretion, there is a pre· 
sumption that the trial court's conclusion is clothed with 
propriety and bona fides, which presumption is rebutted ! 
only by clear evidence adduced by him who attacks it. ! 
The lower court was well aware of the critical situa· 
tion. The judge reviewed Brown, supra, thoroughly be-
fore he made his determination. In his sovereign discre-. 
tion, he found no prejudice sufficient to warrant a re·! 
~· I 
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versal. State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P. 2d 517 
(1968), elaborates on the advantaged position the judge 
maintains: 
"Due to the responsibility of the trial court 
in controlling the admissibility of evidence, and 
his advantaged position to pass on such matters, 
it is his prerogative to make this determination. 
For those reasons his ruling should be indulged 
with a presumption of correctness, and should not 
be disturbed unless it clearly appears that he was 
in error." Id. at 518-19. 
Because of the trial court's advantaged position this court 
in Moser v. Zion's Co-op., 114 Utah 58, 197 P. 2d 136 
(1948), stated that the Supreme Court could not substi-
tute its discretion for that of the trial court on the ques-
tion of granting or denying the motion for a new trial, and 
that the Supreme Court would not interfere unless the 
trial judge's abuse in its exercise of discretion is clearly 
shown. See also O'Neil v. Cramption, 140 P. 2d 308 
(Wash. 1943). Appellant has failed to meet his burden 
of proof in showing that the comment was clearly prejudi-
cial and his cause must therefore fail. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the 
lower court should be affinned. Because of the facts o! 
the case, the surrounding circumstance, and the nature 
of the prosecutor's comment, the improper question did 
not constitute reversible error. Any prejudice of the jury 
was substantially cured by the court's admonition. The 
judgment must be affinned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
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Chief Assistant Attorney General 
WILLIAM T. EVANS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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